The Issues
What do we mean by the term de-industrialization? To simplify, define our country as producing only two commodities -agricultural goods which are exported and manufacturing goods which are imported, with three factors of production -labor which is mobile between the two sectors, land which is used only in agriculture, and capital which is used only in manufacturing. Assume further that our country satisfies what trade economists call the "small country" assumption, and thus that it takes its terms of trade as exogenous, dictated by world markets. De-industrialization can be defined under those simplifying assumptions most easily as the movement of labor out of manufacturing and in to agriculture.
If a country de-industrializes because its comparative advantage in agriculture has been strengthened either by productivity advance on the land (or more land), or by increasing openness in the world economy, or both, then GDP increases in the short-run. In the case of more land or more productive land, and if the country is still assumed to be "small" -a condition we think applies to the Ottoman Empire --then the country faces no change in its terms of trade. 1 In the case of increasing openness, the country enjoys an unambiguous terms of trade improvement as declining world trade barriers raise export prices and lower import prices in the home market. Whether real wages in towns and living standards in villages also increase depends on the direction of the terms of trade change, whether the export commodities include foodstuffs, and whether foodstuffs dominate the budgets of poor families. That is, it depends on whether the export commodities are wheat, barley and tobacco (a big share of the worker's budget) or silk and opium (a small share). Whether GDP growth rates rise in the long run depends on whether industry generates accumulation and productivity externalities that agriculture does not. If 1 Alternatively, if the country is "large" and has an influence on world prices, then it will suffer a terms of trade deterioration, in that it has to share part of the labor productivity gains in the agricultural export sector with its trading partners. The "large" country conditions probably began to apply to Egypt and its cotton exports after the 1860s, but Egypt is not included in our Ottoman Empire definition. We define the Empire to exclude Egypt since it had different endowments, commodity specialization and significant autonomy in the 19 th century. The Empire includes present day Turkey, greater Syria, Iraq and the Balkans. The following Balkan regions were under Ottoman rule during some part of the 19 th century: Macedonia 1800-1913; Albania 1800-1912; Bosnia and Herzegovina 1800-1878; and Romania-Walachia, Romania-Moldavia and Serbia 1800-1829. See Brown (1996) . industrialization is a carrier of growth -as most growth theories imply (e.g. Matsuyama 1992; Helpman 2004) , then de-industrialization could lead to a growth slowdown and a low-income equilibrium that gives the notion of de-industrialization its power in the historical literature. This paper documents Ottoman experience with its terms of trade over the century 1800-1913, explores the connection between de-industrialization and those external price shocks, and then compares this experience with that of the rest of the eastern Mediterranean, as well as with Asia, Latin America and the European periphery. The next section sets the stage by reviewing Ottoman experience with trade policy, world transport costs, Ottoman railroads, and thus with world market integration. Section 3 reviews the de-industrialization debate as it applies to the Ottoman Empire and the rest of the eastern Mediterranean while section 4 assesses the de-industrialization evidence. Section 5 reports the external terms of trade estimates for the Ottoman Turkish and Balkan core, for Levant in the Empire's eastern wing, and for more autonomous Egypt. Section 6 presents a neo-Ricardian model of de-industrialization, and Section 7 uses the model to answer the following questions: How much of Ottoman deindustrialization was due to falling world trade barriers -transport revolutions and European liberal trade policy, how much due to factory-based productivity advance in Europe, how much to changing Ottoman competitiveness in manufacturing, and how much to Ottoman policy?
Falling and Rising Trade Barriers in the Eastern Mediterranean: Setting the Stage
In response to the influx of cheaper manufactured goods from Britain and the rest of western Europe, de-industrialization was the norm for most periphery countries during the 19 th century. The great Middle East scholar Charles Issawi placed the Ottoman case in this general context:
"The Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars gave the region a respite, but in the 1820's and 30's it was hit by the full blast of European competition. Factories were pouring out cheap goods, and peace and increased security in the Mediterranean and improvement in shipping made it possible to land them at low costs. To this should be added the effects of the various commercial treaties, which froze import duties at low levels and opened up the region's markets" (Issawi 1982: 151) .
Thus, the 1838 Treaty is one of the most widely discussed events pertaining to the "collapse" of Ottoman industry in the 19 th century, although liberal Ottoman reforms began to appear earlier in 1826. Most
European industrial countries were still protectionist before they went liberal in the 1860s (Bairoch 1989; O'Rourke and Williamson 1999) , so Britain's agenda was to sign free trade agreements with as many periphery countries as possible in order to gain foreign markets for their manufactures. 2 The 1838 AngloTurkish Commercial Convention was one such commercial agreement. The original treaty was signed in Balta Liman in August of 1838 and went into effect in March of 1839. The "Anglo-Turkish convention eventually became the basis of practically all foreign trade in Turkey" (Puryear 1969: 83) as the Ottoman
Empire signed similar treaties with several other European countries in the following three years. This
Convention was viewed as the next step in the Empire's transition to economic liberalism after the sultan eliminated the Janissary corps in 1826, urban guildsman on the military payroll that were the strongest advocates of protectionism (Quataert 1994: 764) .
The 1838 Treaty eliminated all local monopolies, allowed British merchants to buy goods anywhere in the Empire, and exempted foreign (but not domestic) merchants from an 8 percent internal customs duty that had been levied previously on goods transported within the empire. 3 Export duties were raised from 3 to 12 percent and import duties from 3 to 5 percent (Issawi 1966: 38) . 4 One of the present authors had argued previously that the importance of these treaties has been overstated (Pamuk 1987: 20) since they did not represent a drastic revision from the liberal course already set in 1826. It appears that Donald Quataert agrees: "Commerce between [Britain and the Ottoman Empire] already was increasing dramatically: British exports to the empire had doubled in value during the late 1820's and doubled again before 1837" (Quataert 1994: 825) . However, by locking the government into fixed import duties these treaties did prevent the Ottomans from providing any subsequent protection to domestic industry. Indeed, between 1865 and 1905, average tariff rates were fairly stable at 7.5 percent in the Empire. These low 'revenue-producing' tariffs were consistent with free trade policy, and they were equivalent to those prevailing in Asia. In contrast, average tariff rates in protectionist Latin America and the United States were about 30 percent in the middle of the period, 5 or four times that of the Ottoman Empire (Williamson 2006a (Williamson , 2006b ).
It may seem odd that the literature never mentions political pressure exerted by export interest groups who, after all, stood to gain significantly from the treaties, and how they came to overwhelm import-competing interest groups, when the opposite was true of Latin America and the United States.
This can be attributed to two factors. First, the export oriented agricultural producers were not well organized. Second, the Ottoman government signed the Free Trade Treaties in order to obtain the political support of Britain against the threats from Russia and Mohammed Ali of Egypt, not because of pressure from export interests. The elimination of monopolies also had a powerful short run impact on deindustrialization, as we shall see below.
The move to free trade and the dramatic decline in transportation costs (Harlaftis and Kardasis 2000) contributed to a boom in Ottoman trade during the 19 th century, especially with western Europe.
Imports increased from £5.2 million in 1840 to £39.4 million in 1913, at about 3.3 percent per annum, and since "the prices of the traded commodities were considerably lower on the eve of World War I than in 1840, the increases in trade volumes were actually greater" (Pamuk 1987: 23) . Between 1840 and 1873, trade grew even faster with the volume doubling every 11 to 13 years (Pamuk 1987: 30) . Placed in a comparative framework with other periphery countries, the "Ottoman-center trade grew faster than the periphery-center trade (from the 1820s) until the early 1870's, but the rate of growth of Ottoman exports lagged behind the rate of growth of total exports from the periphery after the 1870's … for the period 1840-1913 as a whole, per capita exports from the Ottoman Empire expanded at rates close to but lower than those of per capita world trade and per capita center-periphery trade" (Pamuk 1987: 37) .
We note, therefore, that trade grew faster before 1870 than after.
Steamships and railroads constitute the two major transport innovations that contributed to the booming Ottoman trade during the period. Steamships could be built much larger than their sail counterparts and their rise to dominance lowered freight costs and stimulated trade for the region.
Steamers were introduced into the eastern Mediterranean in the late 1820s, and they became a real presence after the 1840s. Indeed, all sea-going countries established "steamship companies between the 1830s and the 1850s, which competed for cargo … transportation in the Mediterranean" (Harlaftis and Kardasis 2000: 246) . More to the point, the freight factor on wheat fell by nearly 80 percent on London imports from the Black Sea and the Mediterranean (Harlaftis and Kostelenos 2007 Kurmuş (1983: 411-12) commented that anecdotal evidence was being "accepted as constituting some part of the historical truth" which would serve "to substitute antiquarianism for scientific work." The Kurmuş challenge produced a response by one of the current authors whose previous book The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913 will be used extensively in this survey (Pamuk 1987 century when compared with domestic and handicraft production" (Quataert 1994: 898) . Since cotton spinning and hand weaving were performed part-time by family members using extremely simple technology, it may seem implausible to argue that the demise of local textile production destroyed a 19 th century Ottoman platform for modern industrialization. Yet, economic historians assign the same importance to home-based cotton spinning and weaving in Britain: "proto-industrial" cottage industries are said to have supplied the platform for the factory-based British industrial revolution that followed in the late 18 th century (Mendels 1972; Mokyr 1993: chps. 1-3; Weisdorf 2006; and see Petmezas 1990 ).
Furthermore, employment of women and children was central to the process then too (de Vries 1994).
Hence, this paper will consider both cottage and factory industry in the Ottoman Empire, even though the data are often sparse for the former.
Measuring De-Industrialization
The traditional view of Ottoman manufacturing is that it steadily collapsed in the wake of the influx of European manufactured goods. The Napoleonic Wars had disrupted international trade and shielded the eastern Mediterranean from the impact of the Industrial Revolution. However, local textiles began to retreat soon after the wars ended in 1815. Western provinces of the Empire, the Balkans and western Anatolia were first to face the impact of imports. It is clear, for example, that the strong manufacturing activity in the mountainous region of Thessaly in central-northern Greece reached its peak in the 1810s (Petmezas 1990) . Consular and traveler's reports are riddled with anecdotal accounts relating the demise of industry (Quataert 1994: 888 Empire between the 1830s and the 1850s deepened the de-industrialization shock still further. After all, the terms of trade soared between 1815 and the late 1850s (Figure 1) , and it more than doubled over the two decades after the late 1830s. It increased by 2.6 times between 1800 and 1860 ( Table 2 ).
The Ottoman Empire was completely self-sufficient in cotton textiles until about 1820, but the deluge of cheap European industrial goods changed all of that. Pamuk reconstructs the decline of Ottoman cotton textiles by using an identity to estimate the domestic consumption and production of textiles for the areas within the 1911 borders of the empire --Macedonia, present day Turkey, greater Syria and Iraq.
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He identifies the period from the 1820s to the mid 1870s as the crucial one for the decline of cotton handicrafts, a result consistent with the fact that the biggest terms of trade improvement took place in this period, as we shall see below. Weavers suffered, but domestic spinning also declined dramatically in the face of import competition: spinning output "fell from 11,550 tons per year in 1820-2, to 8,250 tons in 1840-2, to 3,000 tons in 1870-2" (Pamuk 1987: 118) . Note that the biggest collapse in local spinning output was between 1840/2 and 1870/2 -74 percent, not between 1820/2 and 1840/2 -29 percent, an observation consistent with the fact that the external price shock was much bigger after the 1830s ( Figure   1 ). 8 In Syria, in the eastern wing of the Empire, de-industrialization forces hit hard too (Issawi 1988: 374) .
Aleppo was estimated to have had 40,000 handlooms in the 18 th century, while the numbers were down to 25,000 in the 1820s -a 37 or 38 percent fall from the 18 th century highs, and averaged 5,125 between 1838 and 1850 -for an 80 percent fall from the 1820s. Damascus was estimated to have had 34,000
handlooms in the 18 th century, while the numbers were down to 12,000 in the 1820s -a 65 percent fall from the 18 th century highs, and averaged 2,355 between 1838 and 1850 -an 80 percent fall from the 1820s. One wonders how much of the decline between "the 18 th century" and the 1820s can be attributed to competition from modern British factories after 1815 and the peace, and how much of it can be attributed to the late 18 th century when Britain, before the factories, began to take over the Atlantic and
European market from India, the Middle East and other competitors (Clingingsmith and Williamson 2008) . In any case, we note again that de-industrialization was dramatic up to about 1860, and so too was the terms of trade boom. Not all industries were damaged by foreign competition. Due to an increased world demand, carpet making, copper work, earthenware, inlaid woodworking, lace making, silk reeling, and embroidery were able to thrive despite foreign competition and trade liberalism (Issawi 1982: 153; Quataert 1994: 890) . Indeed, some of the above industries, and even the textile industry itself, persisted until the First World War and after.
Some have argued that Pamuk may have overstated the extent to which handicrafts suffered.
Quataert thinks he understated hand-spun yarn production, and thus that his estimates of domestic production and consumption of cotton textiles must be in error. Hence, Quataert suggests that handspinning "remained an important source for Ottoman textile producers and accounted for a considerable proportion of all cotton yarn being used in the empire, at least 25 percent in c.1900" (Quataert 1993: 14) . While he also claims that Pamuk's reconstruction of the cotton textiles decline does not account for the fact that imported yarn and cloth may have created new domestic jobs, Quataert fails to offer any explicit revision of Pamuk's reconstruction. Nor is Quataert explicit about the size of the demise of local textile production in the face of foreign competition. Thus, we will stick to Pamuk's estimates and the overall decline they suggest with the exception of an upwards revision in the volume of local spinning.
Still, although the domestic import-competing industry suffered, why was it able to survive the foreign competition? There are a number of hypotheses suggested by the literature. First, perhaps foreign goods were not able to penetrate into regions distant from major trade routes or ports, especially before the railway boom late in the century. Ottoman geography offered some protection to local industry, just as it did in the Latin American interior (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004; Bértola and Williamson 2004; Williamson 2006c) . Support for this hypothesis can also be inferred from the price convergence between
Upper and Lower Egypt (Yousef 2000: 354) . These results are especially relevant because they speak to the impact of the transport breakthroughs that occurred in one part of the Middle East very late in the century. Denser rail networks and more navigable waters and roads lowered transportation costs, and these created price convergence and internal trade (Yousef 2000: 356) . Thus, since European imports couldn't be brought cheaply into the more remote areas of the Empire during most of the century, domestic manufactures could still supply local demand in those parts of the interior.
Second, domestic tastes afforded Ottoman handicrafts some staying power. Although British companies attempted to imitate Ottoman styles, often they could not do so satisfactorily, and thus there was still demand for domestic cloth, including cotton cloth (Pamuk 1987: 124) . Their knowledge of local preferences helped domestic manufactures survive in the short run, and the import of foreign techniques and foreign managers increased their efficiency and competitiveness in the longer run. For example, local textile makers eventually became more familiar with synthetic dyestuffs which allowed them to import plain cloth and take advantage of lower priced Ottoman labor to dye it (Quataert 1994: 889) . Third, Issawi argues that "weavers were able to cut their costs greatly by using imported yarn; thus the Industrial Revolution, which had wiped out the spinners, gave the weavers a precarious reprieve" (Issawi 1982: 152) . We are skeptical of this argument since this advantage was given just as freely to weavers abroad who were competing with local weavers. A fourth potential explanation seems more promising. Namely, Large capital-intensive factories were not common in the Ottoman Empire, nor would they have made much economic sense given the factor endowments of the region (Allen 2007 ). There were, however, two waves of Ottoman factory building during this period. The first wave occurred before the treaties, consisting of state-owned factories like Mohamed Ali's prototype establishments in Egypt, and to a lesser extent, like those of Mahmoud II around Istanbul. While they were protected by monopolies from the beginning, these factories "suffered from great inefficiencies, including lack of fuel and metallic raw materials and the total absence of skilled labor" (Issawi 1982: 154; Clark 1974) . They were also poorly managed with military elite serving as supervisors, rather than young men that had been technically trained in Europe. In addition, these factories had dilapidated machinery and inadequate power sources, both of which would have been very expensive to remedy (Owen 1993: 72 and 76) . The liberal treaties assured these factories a short life, but Owen believes that they would have been forced to shut down even in the absence of free trade. The second wave ensued after the 1870's and consisted of factories funded and operated by private interests, and which received little or no financial support from the state.
Although Quataert states that these factories expanded rapidly in number, both Issawi and Pamuk argue that this second wave was also modest (Quataert 1994: 901; Issawi 1982: 155-58; Pamuk 1987: 127) and that their production was still very small compared to handicrafts. Perhaps, but that second wave certainly looks like a supply response to a much more favorable world price environment. And while Turkish (no longer Ottoman) industrialization really took hold only in the 1930s (Issawi 1982: 159) , it might be relevant to point out that while tariffs and quotas on imports increased sharply after 1929, the terms of trade also took a nose dive during that decade, that is, the relative price of manufactures rose. In its absence, we will explore more mundane but promising explanations -factor endowments and the external terms of trade. Table 2 . 10 As it turns out, the first half of the century was the most crucial half. For comparison, Like most of the periphery, the Ottoman Empire specialized in the export of primary products, while importing manufactures, so between 1800 and 1854 P X refers to an unweighted average of wheat, wool, raisins plus figs, tobacco, opium and raw silk. As Appendix 1 indicates, prices for the first four are taken from United States markets, the price of raw silk is from British markets, and the price of opium is from the (infamous) Calcutta market. To derive P X , these six prices are taken as an unweighted average since the share of each commodity export in total exports is not available until 1879, and those weights changed dramatically over the decades before the late 1870s. P M refers to what was primarily manufactured goods and intermediate inputs, and it is proxied by the British export price index.
The External Terms of Trade
Between 1800 and the late 1860's, the price of British manufactured exports fell far faster than did the price of British imported primary products, swinging the terms of trade against Britain and in favor of the periphery. If P M for the Ottoman Empire moved anything like P X for Britain, then the Ottoman Empire certainly received a massive positive price shock over the half century before the Crimean War (Pamuk 1987: 48; based on Imlah 1958 ). The magnitudes were enormous: over the four decades between 1815-1819 and 1855-1859, the Ottoman terms of trade rose almost 2.6 times, for an annual rate of 2.4 percent; even over the longer 1800 to 1860 period, which includes two decades of Napoleonic conflict and suppressed trade, it still rose by a huge annual rate of 1.6 percent per annum.
While no actual Ottoman P M time series data has been tabulated prior to 1854 to confirm these otherwise plausible P X /P M trends, qualitative evidence appears to be consistent with the implied terms of trade surge.
Hence, domestic resources were pulled in to agriculture and other primary product sectors, while the glut of cheap, foreign manufactures flowed into the Empire, pushing domestic resources out of importcompeting industry and perhaps even out of some non-tradable activities.
Ottoman terms of trade data are of far better quality for the period 1854-1913. Between 1855-1859 and 1875-1879, the terms of trade fell by 27 percent, while it did not fall across the so-called "Great Depression," between 1875-1879 and 1893-1898. 11 Indeed, the surprising fact is how stable was the terms of trade over the four decades between 1875-1879 and 1909-1913 when it drifted up at a modest annual 10 P X /P M in Table 2 and Figure 1 are exactly the same for 1860-1913. However, Table 2 explores the extent to which c.i.f. and other adjustments to P M make a difference in trends. They do, documenting an even bigger P X /P M boom up to 1860. See below. 11 That is, all of the fall took place in a few years before 1875 (Figure 1) . rate of 0.4 percent. Furthermore, all of the pre-WWI rise took place after 1896 when the Ottomans enjoyed a 14 percent increase in their terms of trade.
To summarize, if one is looking for evidence of a big de-industrialization impact on the Ottoman Empire, we should see plenty of it in the half century before the late 1850s. We should see little or no evidence of de-industrialization between the late 1850s and the mid-1890s, assuming that the pre-1860 price shock had had enough time to shake out import-competing industries. Finally, we should see only very modest evidence of de-industrialization in the two decades before World War I. (Issawi 1988: 147-51) . These estimates are consistent with the deindustrialization experience in that part of the Empire: "it destroyed a large part of the handicrafts both directly through competition and indirectly by turning consumers' taste to western-type goods," without causing technology spillovers or import substitution (Issawi 1988: 151 
A Neo-Ricardian Three-Sector Model of Ottoman De-Industrialization
We know that a booming terms of trade contributed to Ottoman de-industrialization in the 19 th century, and especially up to the late 1850s. That is, as export prices rose, labor and other resources were pulled out of industry (and non-tradable sectors) and in to the export sector so as to augment its capacity.
The size of these "Dutch Disease" effects were, of course, intensified by the pro-global policies introduced between 1826 and 1838, but we think there were other domestic supply-side forces that might have diminished Ottoman competitiveness with foreign manufactures up to mid-century. We also think these forces might have reversed when the terms of trade ceased to rise after the late 1850s.
During the century before the 1850s, most foodstuffs eaten by village peasants and the urban working class (like barley, rye, lentils, chick peas, beans, olive oil, cheap raisins and figs) were not traded internationally. True, skilled artisans and better off peasants ate wheat bread made from traded wheat, but most ate cheaper bread made from coarser grains that were not traded. Also, foodstuffs were a very large share of family budgets, somewhere between 75 and 80 percent in the urban areas and even higher in the rural areas where 75 percent of the population lived (Pamuk 2001: 28) . Under those conditions, labor productivity in the non-traded part of food production must have influenced manufacturing competitiveness, as Alexander Gerschenkron (1965) and W. Arthur Lewis (1978) , and even Adam Smith argued long ago. Their reasoning went like this: In a pre-industrial economy with relatively stable subsistence wages (Lewis 1954) , any decline in Ottoman food productivity would have put upward pressure on food prices and thus on the nominal wage in every non-food sector, eroding competitiveness with foreign producers. Any rise in Ottoman food productivity or increase in arable land in the interior would have had the opposite effect.
But there was another force at work too. As the Ottoman Empire became more integrated into world commodity markets, increased specialization took the form not only of rising exports of wool, silk and opium, but also of consumer goods like wheat, figs, raisins, olive oil, tobacco and even barley. Any rise in the price of traded consumer goods would have put more upward pressure on the prices of local consumer goods and thus on the nominal wage, eroding competitiveness with foreign producers in import-competing sectors. This would have been manifested by rising food prices relative to other products, by falling profitability in manufacturing, and by a decline in industrial output.
Which of these domestic supply-side forces dominated the Ottoman Empire, especially before the 1860s? Did the global trade boom raise the price of exportable food stuffs at home, augmenting nominal wages and reducing competitiveness in import-competing textiles and other manufacturing activities? Or, was this force offset by the increase in arable land in the interior, thus lowering the price of foodstuffs, at least in the interior, and especially in a pre-railroad era? Did increasing commercial crop land-use compete with non-tradable foodstuffs, raising their price? What was the net effect of all these complex forces on the relative price of food and other key consumer goods?
Concern with the price of foodstuffs was used by Lewis (1978) and it also worked well in helping account for exceptional Mexican success in minimizing the damage inflicted by foreign imports on its domestic textile industry (Dobado, Gómez Galvarriato and Williamson 2008 In order to formalize our intuitions about the relationship between relative prices and deindustrialization, we use a simple neo-Ricardian model. 12 Assume an economy with three sectors: textiles --the manufacturing importable 13 (T); wheat, fruit, olive oil, opium, silk, tobacco and wool --the primary-product commodity exportables (C); and barley, rye, lentils and beans, the non-tradable foodstuffs (F). We assume that textiles and commodity exports are traded in world markets and sell for the world prices p T and p C , respectively, 14 while p F is determined by local supply and demand. Labor (L) is mobile between all three sectors, is the only factor of production, and costs a nominal wage w per unit.
As is standard in Ricardian models, we abstract from capital and land for simplicity. Finally, when we talk about a decrease in L T , we refer to this contraction in textile employment as absolute deindustrialization, and when we talk about a decrease in L T /L, we refer to this contraction in the textile employment share as relative de-industrialization.
To create a link between agricultural food productivity and wages in the textile sector, we follow Lewis (1954 Lewis ( , 1978 in assuming that the real wage in food units was constant (indeed, we set w/p F =1), at least in the short run and medium term. The Lewis assumption may, of course, have been violated in the very long run, but all that we require is that it was quite stable over most of the 19 th century. The Lewis assumption implies the possibility of unemployment and underemployment, so L represents employment rather than the population.
Suppose output in each sector is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production function, where the intercepts F, C, and T are productivity parameters (or include the impact of omitted endowments, like land and irrigation canals) and diminishing returns holds everywhere. Labor demand is given by:
where α, β, and γ are output elasticities. If we assume that there is no productivity change in this preindustrial economy, the growth rates (*) of labor demand are
Since the nominal wage is equal to the price of a unit of food, village employment in food production is fixed. Growth of the own wage in textile production (w/p T ) leads to a decline in the absolute number of workers employed there.
Thus, de-industrialization results from an increase in the own wage in textiles.
There are three forces pushing the own-wage upwards (and thus reducing wage competitiveness with imports), one foreign and two domestic. First, the own wage in textiles would increase if the world price for its output fell (that is, if the Ottoman external terms of trade rose due to a fall in the price of imports, as it did up to the late 1850s). Second, it would also increase if the nominal wage rose, induced by a rise in food prices, induced, in turn, by some negative shock to local food output productivity. One source of such a negative shock might have been the shift of food production away from high yielding hectares to accommodate the expansion of export crops like wheat, fruit, olive oil and tobacco, a shift encouraged by foreign demand. Third, it could be induced by a rise in the price of exported wheat, fruit, olive oil and even tobacco.
The growth rate of textile relative to total employment, our measure of relative deindustrialization, is:
14 That is, p T and p C are assumed to be exogenous to the Ottoman economy.
The shares of textile and commodity export employment in total employment are given by θ TL and θ CL , respectively. Thus, relative de-industrialization will result whenever the own wage in textiles is growing sufficiently fast compared to the own wage in wheat and other commodity exports. Moreover, deindustrialization will be most severe when the difference in own wage growth rates between T and C is largest, and this can only result when the external terns of trade booms (p C * > p T *), since, by assumption, w* is everywhere the same in the domestic economy. As it turns out, the condition that must be satisfied
To the extent that β and γ are similar, and that (1-θ TL ) > θ CL , the ratio on the right-hand side will certainly be less than one. This implies that own wage growth in wheat and other commodity exports would have to be even higher to counteract the relative de-industrialization effect of own wage growth in textiles. In short, we expect to see relative de-industrialization whenever own wage growth in textiles is positive, unless own wage growth in commodity exports is much greater. Own-wage growth in the commodity export sector seems less likely to the extent that nominal wages and prices in export sectors like wheat should have been moving alike, but any own wage growth in the export sector would have dampened the de-industrialization effect because it would have reduced L C , which is in the denominator of the relative de-industrialization measure. Relative de-industrialization results when nominal wage growth is sufficiently bigger than the growth of the terms-of-trade favoring commodity exports, which discourages production in textiles relative to commodity exports. Thus, relative de-industrialization should have been most severe when nominal wage growth was strongest and when the terms of trade were shifting most strongly in favor of wheat and other commodity exports.
Assessing the Causes of Ottoman De-Industrialization
It is certainly comforting that the evidence in Table 2 is so consistent with our simple neoRicardian model. First, the model invoked the Lewis assumption of stable real wages, and they were indeed, especially over the first sixty years of the 19 th century: they rose by only 11 percent between 1800
and 1880, and they fell by 8 percent up to 1860. Second, the model predicted that a rapid rise in the own wage in manufacturing (here proxied by textiles), especially compared with the commodity export sector, would generate powerful de-industrialization forces. And indeed, the own wage in textiles soared across the 19 th century. Furthermore, the biggest rise took place between 1800 and 1860 -3.3 percent per annum -precisely the decades of most dramatic de-industrialization. The own wage in the export sector also rose up to 1860, but by not nearly as much as textiles (0.8 versus 3.3 percent per annum). Third, the rise in the own wage in manufacturing between 1800 and 1860 was being pushed partly by a nominal wage boom (1 percent per annum) --accounting for a third of the own wage increase, but mostly by the collapse in manufactures prices (-2.2 percent per annum: proxied by imported textiles) -accounting for two-thirds of the own wage increase. Recall that our model predicted a nominal wage boom. Fourth, the predicted rise in food prices seems to have taken place, as the consumer price index (dominated by foodstuffs) doubled between 1800 and 1860. The rising CPI pushed up the nominal wage by almost the same amount --confirming the predictions of Gerschenkron, Lewis, Smith and our neo-Ricardian model, thereby diminishing Ottoman wage competitiveness in manufacturing.
Fifth, the rise in the own wage in manufacturing slowed down considerably between 1860 and 1880 to 1.5 percent per annum --precisely the decades of a diminished rate of de-industrialization and some signs of re-industrialization. Consistent with that experience, the own wage in the export sector actually grew a little faster than it did in textiles (2.3 versus 1.5 percent per annum). Furthermore, during these two decades the modest rise in the nominal wage (0.1 percent per annum) accounts for only 7 percent increase in the own wage in manufacturing, while the fall in manufacturing prices (-1.4 percent per annum) accounts for 93 percent. This small rise in the nominal wage is consistent with the 14 percent fall in the CPI, the latter induced, presumably, by the 11 percent fall in the food export price. Sixth, and finally, the neo-Ricardian model loses its relevance after 1880 when the real wage rises quite impressively -0.8 percent per annum -presumably because the rate of productivity advance in both the export and import competing sectors rose. (Table 2) , the added impact of policy change was to diminish Px/Pm and increase the relative price of manufactures (Pm) by 31 percent, which must have greatly eased the de-industrialization pressures on local manufacturing. These forces also begin to reveal a differential impact of policy-cum-transport on coast versus interior since they served to raise Px/Pm in the interior by 8 percent (diminishing the total effect on Px/Pm from the coastal 31 percent fall to an interior 23 percent fall). After the 1860s, neither the external terms of trade nor Ottoman policy changed much, so de-industrialization forces lost their destructive impact on coastal industry. Things were different in the interior, however, as the railroads opened up those markets to import penetration and exports to world markets. Table 3 estimates that the terms of trade in the interior rose by 30 percent, as declining transport costs and the removal of the interior trade tax served to push exportable (e.g. wheat) prices up to world levels and to push importable (e.g. textiles)
prices down to world levels. 16 So, while de-industrialization forces were quiet on the Ottoman coast after 1860, they certainly were still present in the Ottoman interior.
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The economic impact of the core on the periphery had its source in two forces which arose during the first global century. The first was the world-wide transport revolution that served to integrate world commodity markets (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999: Ch. 3; Shah Mohammed and Williamson 2004) . It caused a boom in trade between core and periphery, created commodity price convergence for tradable goods between all world markets, and contributed to a rise in every country's external terms of trade, including the periphery. The second force came from the derived demand for industrial intermediates, like
Ottoman raw silk and wool, which soared as manufacturing production led the way in the core. Thus, as 15 The literature often fails to appreciate that it is changes in policy, transport costs and world prices that matter, not levels. After all, de-industrialization implies a change, e.g. a decline in the relative or even absolute importance of manufacturing. 16 The share of transportation costs in the price of a good moved to and from the Ottoman interior varied substantially according to the good (low-value, high-bulk primary products versus high-value, low-bulk textiles, but also wheat versus other primary goods) and the distance from port. Hence, the estimates underlying Table 3 are rough. Quataert (1977: 143-54) offers an excellent discussion of this issue and some international comparisons with wheat transport on the Anatolian Railway after 1890. The cereal growing areas in Anatolia could not send any wheat to Istanbul or Izmir, the leading ports in western Anatolia, before the railroad, but they did send some to the southern port of Mersin on the Mediterranean via camel caravans. Quataert indicates that per ton-kilometer costs in transporting Anatolian wheat to these ports by railroad were initially significantly higher than on the routes between Chicago and New York. However, he estimates that ton-kilometer charges for wheat and barley dropped across the late 19th century, so that they accounted for 22 percent of the final price in Istanbul at the end of the period. Most other export commodities produced in the interior, like fruits, nuts and tobacco, benefited to a smaller extent from the arrival of the railroads (Kurmuş 1974) . Table 3 summarizes this evidence by assuming that between the 1860s and 1913 the railroads by themselves lowered textile prices in the interior by about 7 percent and raised primary product prices in the interior by about 15 percent, all relative to coastal prices. core economies raised their industrial output shares, manufacturing output growth raced ahead of GDP growth. Rapid productivity growth lowered the cost and price of manufactures, and by so doing generated a soaring derived demand for raw materials in the core. This event was reinforced by accelerating income per capita growth and a high income elasticity of demand for luxury consumption goods, like Ottoman wheat, raisins, figs and even opium. Since industrialization was driven by unbalanced productivity advance favoring manufacturing relative to agriculture and other natural-resource based activities, the relative price of manufactures fell everywhere, especially in the periphery where they were imported. The world transport revolution made it possible for the distant periphery to supply this booming demand for primary products. Both forces produced positive, powerful and sustained terms of trade shocks in the periphery, raising the relative price of primary products, and through an epoch which stretched over as much as seventy or eighty years.
Eventually these two forces abated. The rate of decline in real transport costs along sea lanes slowed down, approaching a late 20 th century steady state (Shah Mohammed and Williamson 2004) . The rate of growth of manufacturing slowed down in the core as the transition to industrial maturity was completed. As these two forces abated, the resulting slow down in primary product demand growth was reinforced by resource-saving innovations in the industrial core, induced, in large part, by those high and rising primary product prices during the 19 th century terms of trade upswing. Thus, the secular boom faded, eventually turning into a secular bust. Exactly when and where the boom turned to bust depended on the export commodities in which a periphery region specialized, but the periphery peak ranged between the 1850s and the 1890s.
This 130-year cycle in the periphery terms of trade is illustrated in Figure 2 Egypt's terms of trade 1820-1913 has been constructed using only cotton prices to estimate export price trends, a reasonable assumption since cotton was Egypt's dominant 19 th century export commodity accounting for "one-third of exports in the 1840's-50's, over 80 percent in the 1880's and over 90 percent in 1910-14" (Issawi 1982: 31) . For the years 1820-1899, Alexandrian cotton prices were used (Issawi 1966: 447-8) . For the remaining 14 years, American cotton prices were taken as a proxy for
Egyptian prices (US Department of Commerce 1975: 208) . This US cotton price proxy was chosen because Egyptian cotton followed closely "world, and more particularly American, prices" (Issawi 1982: 41).
The series reported by Issawi gives the cotton price in dollars per qantar, so his was converted to dollars per pound in order to make it consistent with the US series. In Egypt, the qantar was equal to 120.6135 pounds until 1835. Thus, for the period 1820-1935, the reported figures were divided by 120.6135 in order to obtain $/lb. After 1835, Egyptian qantars were equal to 99 pounds, so the reported figures were divided by that number to get $/lb (Issawi 1966: 518) .
To get the real export price series, the resulting nominal price series was divided by the US consumer price index for each of the years 1820 -1913 (McCusker 1992 and then indexed at 1880=100. In order to derive the terms of trade series, the nominal cotton price series was divided by the price of British exports (a proxy for the price of Egyptian imports) for each year of the period (Mitchell and Deane 1962: 331-32) .
Although cotton was always Egypt's dominant export commodity, it increased in importance throughout the century. Egypt's other important exportable, wheat, held substantial export shares earlier in the century (Issawi 1982: 31) . In order to see if the cotton series accurately captures a more comprehensive export price index, the price of wheat (US Department of Commerce 1975: 208-9) was correlated against the price of Egyptian cotton. The correlation is very high, indicating that Egypt's cotton terms of trade series is likely to be a good indicator of its terms of trade as a whole. However, this Source: Williamson (2008b : Table 5 .3) for all but Ottoman observations, which are calculated from Pamuk (1987: 115) . 
